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Javier Milei and the Long Shadow of the IMF

Javier Milei and the Long Shadow of the IMF

In Argentina, economic chaos and political upheaval expose how the IMF's promise of stability has become an instrument of managed decline.

Lola Allen

On Sunday, Javier Milei, the chainsaw-wielding libertarian president of Argentina, emerged as the resounding winner in the country’s mid-term election. His La Libertad Avanza party triumphed in large swaths of the South American nation, taking more than 40 per cent of the vote. The result surprised many, even Milei himself. As austerity had increasingly bitten under his presidency, Milei’s approval ratings had collapsed to the low thirties. Meanwhile, the Buenos Aires governor Axel Kicillof—one of the leaders of the main opposition party, who, as former economy minister, led Argentina’s negotiations with creditors after the 2001 default and remains a key critic of the IMF’s influence—was polling competitively, and beat Milei’s party easily in Argentina’s municipal elections held in September. Against this backdrop, Milei’s latest victory is being interpreted  more as a conditional mandate to stave off an economic catastrophe and to calm markets than a resounding endorsement of Milei himself. 

As Milei’s domestic position has crumbled over the past year, both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Washington have intervened to keep him viable. In late September 2025, US Treasury secretary Scott Bessent pledged to “do what is needed” to support Argentina, a move in which the political stakes were entirely transparent: US Treasury support landed just in time to stave off a devaluation ahead of midterm elections. When Argentina needed dollars, the money came. 

IMF funds also continued to flow despite missed targets. For the IMF, Argentina has become both a proving ground and a warning sign. Yet Argentina’s tumultuous economic history is not just about one volatile leader. Instead, it demonstrates how financial institutions built to stabilize the global economy are now using the failing debt architecture as leverage for extraction, and how, in the name of reform, entire countries are being forced to renege on development and climate goals to service debt and appease the markets.